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"Excellence in the surface Coast Guard" was examined by
interviewing eighteen senior Coast Guard officers, and then going
aboard two cutters that they nominated as being excellent. The
interviews with the senior officers revealed that there is a
solid consensus among them about the vision of excellence. It
includes such factors as the commanding officer setting the tone,
operational accomplishment, and training the troops . In
chapters I through VT we write about what these senior officers
said. Aboard the cutters we learned that excellence is
attainable, and that common characteristics did exist among the
two cutters. They are; the commanding officer is the driver, the
unit family, pride at all levels, and consistent management. We
write about these attributes in chapters VII through X. In our
concluding chapter we offer our recommendations on what can be
done to further expand the study, and on ways that our findings
can be used in the Coast Guard.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Excellent: "...being of the highest quality;
exceptionally good; superb". It is probably safe to say that
most Coast Guard officers share the desire to perform in an
excellent manner. And most would like the units to which
they are assigned, either as leader or led, to do the same.
But excellence is an elusive quality. Just how is it
defined for a cutter, an air station, or a staff office?
What makes one cutter or station stand out from the rest?
What does it do differently from average units? And what
does it take, in terms of priorities in programs and
policies, to achieve it? Questions like these have been
asked and discussed on bridges and in wardrooms and CPO
messes since the infancy of naval service. Today, when the
Coast Guard is continually being asked to accomplish more
and more with less and less, the answers have taken on a
more critical aspect, and yet remain as elusive as ever.
This thesis gave us the opportunity to attempt to find some
answers
.
We decided to focus our look at excellence by
concentrating on surface ships in the Coast Guard. Our
reasons for restricting this study to cutters are simple.
First, since a majority of our experience thus far has been
aboard cutters, we hoped our background would help in
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conducting our research. Secondly, our ambition is to
continue in surface operations, and we hope that what we
learned will help us to be the best we can. Finally, we
wanted to contribute something to those that are following
on behind us. Perhaps what we found could benefit the
junior officer as he or she struggles to understand and
manipulate the complicated mix of structures, traditions,
customs, people, and technologies that make up a cutter
getting the job done.
We made our decision to limit our study exclusively to
the high endurance and medium endurance cutter classes for
three reasons-'-. First, we wanted to study units that were
basically similar, especially in function and mission, in
order to limit the effect of any complicating factors in our
study. Secondly, we needed a sufficiently large population
to give us an adequate sample. And finally, we wanted a
type of unit on which a great many senior officers would
have served in their careers. By limiting ourselves to
cutters in these classes we are certainly not saying that
other units cannot be excellent, or even that cutters in the
^ High endurance cutters range from 327' to 37R' in
length, with crews of 15-18 officers and 130-15PI enlisted,
while medium endurance cutters are from 180' to 270' long,
with crews of 7-10 officers and 65-90 enlisted. Both
cutters carry out similar missions such as search and rescue
and enforcement of laws and treaties. Being larger, the
HECs undertake longer deployments and are also tasked with
Navy missions such as ASW. There are approximately 50 HECs
and MECs presently serving in the Coast Guard fleet.
HEC/MEC classes have a better shot at it. It's simply that
the HEC/MEC classes best fit our criteria for this study.
Our study was a two-phase undertaking. Phase I focused
on the opinions of senior officers about excellence. Phase
II involved getting out to the excellent units to find out
what was going on. During Phase I, we interviewed eighteen
officers(0-5 and above). We asked these officers to
describe their vision of an "excellent" Coast Guard cutter,
to tell us what it looked like and what it was doing
differently from other cutters. We also asked them to tell
us what factors they and other officers in staff positions
used to evaluate a unit's excellence. Our first five
chapters cover these topics. Finally, we asked them if they
knew of any cutters that met their vision of excellence. We
then selected cutters to visit based on (1) the number of
times recommended, (2) the strength of the recommendation,
and (3) whether the vessel was available to be interviewed
during our time frame.
Admittedly, we relied exclusively on these subjective
opinions to determine Phase II targets. But we could not
find a set of hard copy, objective measures that is used
Coast Guard wide as the standard by which cutters are
evaluated. Certainly, some quantifiable measures do exist,
such as inspection results, REFTRA scores, reenlistment
rates, etc. However, this data is very difficult to get at
in a timely fashion and often used in differing degrees by
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staffs to evaluate a unit's performance. The result is that
there is widespread disagreement in the Coast Guard as to
the priorities or weights these measures should be given in
determining the overall excellence of a cutter. Tn point of
fact, the determination of excellence is subjective.
During Phase TI we visited two of the consensus cutters
to see if we could identify what attributes or
characteristics were commonly present. During our visits we
held unstructured interviews with the commanding officer,
the executive officer, and small groups from the wardroom,
CPO mess, and the mess deck. In chapters six through ten we
tell you about the excellent cutters.
We feel what we have is significant. We believe that
what the eighteen senior officers had to say about
excellence and how it is viewed is worth knowing. They have
been there. Their experience is driving and directing the
Coast Guard today. For those of us whose ambition is to
serve o.\ and command a Coast Guard cutter, knowledge of
their experience is invaluable. To complete the picture,
what we saw on board the excellent cutters was also
exciting. We found that being an excellent cutter takes
more than being lucky in the personnel draw or having a new
vessel or a good homeport. Telling their stories is part of
what this thesis is about.
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II. A VIEW FROM THE TOP
The officers and men of a cutter form an opinion about
the performance of their unit but ultimately the unit's
reputation in the fleet is a result of evaluations by senior
officers. These senior officers are the headquarters and
district staff officers responsible for the operational and
administrative supervision of cutters in their areas. The
different officers approve operational orders, budget re-
quests, and admin reports as well as review message traffic
and inspection reports. They form opinions about a cutter's
operational level from the inputs they have examined. These
opinions are further refined through informal conversations
between senior officers until a consensus is reached con-
cerning a cutter's evaluation. Very seldom is a unit privy
to this process and must deduce its status by formal or
informal "attaboys" from superior or peers.
This thesis is an attempt to identify what attributes
exist in a Coast Guard surface command labeled excellent by
its superiors. In outlining our research we found our-
selves having to investigate several other questions. Is it
possible to identify cutters classified as excellent? What
attributes, if any, do these cutters have in common? Just
how does a unit conduct business to gain the reputation of
excellent in the fleet?
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The methodology used in Phase I of the study consisted
of interviewing commanders, captains and admirals with
extensive operational experience aboard medium and high
endurance cutters. Almost all of the eighteen officers
interviewed had commanded at least one of the classes of
vessels. The interviews were unstructured so as to allow
for maximum input from interviewees. The average interview
lasted ninety minutes.
The interviews covered two specific areas. First, we
wanted to get these officers to give us their subjective
opinions on what factors constituted excellence aboard a
cutter. And finally, we asked them to identify cutters, by
name, which they felt met their definition of excellence.
The questions were organized into the four following
groups
.
1. In general, what attributes or characteristics does an
excellent Coast Guard cutter possess? What common
traits do they display that sets them above the
average unit?
2. As a senior staff officer or evaluator, what means or
tools do you utilize to evaluate units under your
control? Please, limit your answer to those methods
available to you from your desk or office.
3. When you visit a unit dockside, what do you look for
in determining the present evaluation of that cutter?
4. Can you name any specific commands that meet the
description you have given us? What percentage of
cutters in the Coast Guard today do you consider
excellent. In your opinion are the number of excellent
ships increasing or decreasing?
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The data was then analyzed for each officer and a list
of attributes for each of the first three questions com-
piled. We then identified those attributes mentioned
repeatedly and finalized our list. The findings from the
questioning will be discussed in the next four chapters.
We became aware after several interviews that there is a
consensus among senior officers on what must be happening
aboard a unit and what output from a unit must be evident
for it to be classified excellent.
14
III. THE MENU OF EXCELLENCE
Senior officers agreed that there are many duties aboard
a vessel that must be performed in a professional manner if
the unit is to excell. As one captain put it, "there's a
whole menu of things that have to be accomplished for you to
have an excellent cutter." As explained, the officers we
interviewed were of homogeneous operational backgrounds
and their answers to the question of "What attributes does
an excellent cutter display?" were very similar. Each
officer's responses were examined by both of us. A listing
was then compiled of the attibutes mentioned by the
officers. We examined this list and selected those
attributes which were mentioned repeatedly. The product of
this orocess are the following attributes:
* The commanding officer sets the tone
* The successful completion of operational
missions
* The importance of a competent executive officer
* The right people have the right stuff
* A good ship is going to look good
* Training the troops to do their jobs
We are not foolish enough to claim that there are not
other attributes that exist on board an excellent cutter or
that we have listed the most important ones. We realize
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that there are constraints in attempting to answer such a
question. The officers answered the questions from
different viewpoints. Some had just completed a tour aboard
a cutter and were speaking from recent experiences. Others
were speaking from their viewpoints of operational and
administrative commanders. The information provided us was
subjective and therefore it was impossible to analyze the
qualitative or quanitative measures used by the individual
senior officers.
A. THE COMMANDING OFFICER SETS THE TONE
The single attribute mentioned by every officer
interviewed was that the commanding officer (CO) of a ship
"sets the tone" for the performance of the unit. Tt is the
responsibi 1 ty of every CO to "set the course that his vessel
will follow" and recognize when fine adjustments must be
made to the ship's heading to maintain that course. A
traditional philosophy is that the ship reflects the
personality of the commanding officer, as if, the two become
an integral unit. If a CO is "willing to accept mediocrity"
then that is what the crew is going to give him.
Senior officers agreed that every new CO has a plan when
he takes command. Some of these officers confessed to
writing it down and to frequently referring back to it so as
not to wander away from the plan during their tour. The
captain of an excellent cutter is one that is able to
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communicate to his crew the goals and objectives of his
plan. They should be broad, clear, consistent, and
frequently communicated. One captain reflected that one of
his broad objectives was to improve the grooming standards
aboard his command. His objective then became more specific
as it traveled down the chain of command until finally
junior petty officers were reminding non-rates to tuck in
their shirt tails or to get a haircut.
Commanding officers must learn to delegate
responsibility while still not losing touch with what is
going on aboard his command. For the practice to function,
the CO must ensure that he does not "interfere in an area
that he has delegated responsibility" and that he uses the
chain of command to monitor the performance of subordinates.
It is imperative that the CO trust his people and that this
trust is conveyed to them by his actions. This relationship
is especially critical between the captain and the executive
officer. The XO must be told the command policies and held
accountable if they are not carried out. Just as important
is that the XO "be given the latitude and the flexibilty to
do his job." The practice of delegation of respons ib i I ty is
seen at almost every level of superior-subordinate
relationships on excellent units. The idea of giving
subordinates the ball and letting them run with it, provides
the experience necessary for professional development.
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Evident aboard excellent units is the accessibility of
the commanding officer to his crew. It is important for the
CO "not to lock himself in the cabin," leaving it only to go
to the bridge or his car. The CO should be "up and about"
observing his crew at work; especially in those areas where
special projects are being accomplished. The overhaul of
a ship's main engine, the rehabilitation of a berthing area,
or the painting of the hull are good examples of such
projects. A good commanding officer shows "a genuine
concern for the personal problems of his crew." He must be
willing to devote a portion of his own time to personnel
problems that may arise. The CO must be careful not to
become so over zealous that it appears as if he is meddling
into the personal affairs of his people.
Effective commanding officers have proven themselves as
competent shiphandlers and exhibit an above average
knowledge of Coast Guard operations. To retain the
confidence of his crew, the captain must know how to lower
his small boats, properly conduct all drills, and be able
to safely manuever his vessel during critical evolutions. A
captain, with strong feelings on the subject, said that a
crew will "put up with a CO with a temper; they'll put up
with a lush: they'll put up with almost any human failing if
he doesn't let them down when it comes time to do whatever
it is that they're supposed to do." He felt that if a CO is
a poor shiphandler the crew will turn on him no matter how
good he is at his other duties.
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All the officers interviewed agreed that leadership in a
CO was essential for a unit to reach its potential. One
admiral said, "Good leadership is what makes the difference.
Good leadership is what brings out outstanding performance."
When asked what leadership style was most often used, there
were a wide range of answers. But there was agreement among
the officers on what two leadership styles do not work in
the long run - the "God syndrome" and "buddy buddy" type
commanding officers.
The "buddy buddy" type of leadership style is when a CO
makes a habit of going on liberty with his crew and has
everyone call him by his first name. Then when a situation
occurs that illustrates to him that he has lost the respect
of the crew and can no longer function effectively, he
wonders what went wrong. "When the CO becomes part of the
forecastle, he isn't the CO anymore - he's just one of the
guys," as related to us by a captain. An experienced
officer can be on friendly terms with his men without
endangering their professional relationship.
The negative leadership style of commanding obedience or
commanding things to happen has been nicknamed by one
captain as the "God syndrome". The commanding officers who
use this style can be heard saying, "I'm the CO and by the
virtue of the fact that I'm the CO - I'm right." These are
the commanding officers that sometimes get their crews to
work for them but seldom, if ever, are able to get them to
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work with them. Unfortunately, it is a style that young
officers who are getting their first commands often adoot.
Fearing possible failure as a CO and perhaps havina worked
under an officer who used the method, a young officer may
choose to intimidate his crew instead of earning their
respect by his abilities and dedication to duty. Only
experience and serving with CO's who utilize more productive
leadership styles can show that young officer that there are
better ways to command troops.
A captain who had just completed a tour as command inq
officer of a HEC told us that his command philosophy was
centered about four little words.
TALK: A commanding officer must be able to communicate
his goals effectively. "You must be able to convince
your crew that their objectives are your objectives and
that their goals are in consonance with yours." A CO
should keep his crew informed and he should also take the
time to listen to their concerns.
FAIR: There can exist no double standards. Fair and
consistent treatment must be dealt out across theboard.
WORK: The standards of performance expected of a crew
must be gauged relative to those exhibited by the CO.
CARE: A commanding officer must show concern for the
well being of his men in both professional and personal
matters
.
These four little words represent simple truths that
most officers claim to live by and yet so many seem to
forget while in command positions. They are the essential
core about which a successful commanding officer and
excellent unit are formed.
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B. SUCCESSFUL MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT
An attribute which all excellent cutters demonstrate is
the ability to accomplish assigned operational missions.
These are the units that not only perform their primary
duties expertly but who are able to meet the challenqe of
accomplishing a secondary duty with the same expertise.
These are the buoy tenders that conduct helo ops in a
professional manner or the patrol boat that can answer the
call to recharge an aid to navigation. They are units that
are "ready to shift gears" and are not so restricted to
their primary missions that they avoid the opportunity to
pursue another because of unf ami 1 i ar i ty or a fear of
fa ilure
.
Several captains in operational staff oositions reported
that the units with outstanding operational records were the
units that conducted themselves in a enthusiastic and yet
professional manner. According to one captain, they are not
the MEC "that steams around boring holes in the ocean while
on law enforcement patrol." The excellent cutters are the
ones that comply with the Commandant's fuel conservation
program when appropriate. These are the units that conduct
gun shoots or multi-ship exercises when the opportunity
arises. They are the units that conduct open houses in
foreign ports or whose corpsman offers his assistance to a
small hospital on a South Pacific atoll. During Navy
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operations, it is the HEC that the tas^ force commander
praises in his message traffic. Typical of these units is
the practice of concise message traffic that keeps the chain
of command informed of the progress of an operational
mission while it progresses. The reports are never doctored
to hide any problems that the unit may be having. Nor are
they hesitant to call on assistant from the staff
components when the situation warrants.
Whether the cutter's mission is buoy tending, search and
rescue, fisheries patrols, or law enforcement; "the bottom
line is the end result." No matter what operational task it
is given, the excellent cutter will oerform it in a
professional fashion and without major hang ups . These
units have such ship's mottos as "READY TO SERVE" and "C^N
DO - HAVE DONE"
.
C. A COMPETENT EXECUTIVE OFFICER
The majority of the senior officers concurred that next
to the commanding officer, the most important indivi'^ual
aboard a cutter is the executive officer(XO). Most say it
is lonely at the top. Well, it is just as lonely in the
middle. The executive officer of a cutter must behave as if
he is the mirror image of the CO. An XO will normally
assist in the formation of command policies but the XO must
always communicate and enforce those policies as if they
were his own. One officer feels that, "The executve officer
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who sits around the wardroom all day bad mouthinq the
captain will do more to damage a ship than a two foot hole
below the water line."
One commander, who has held twelve commands in his
career, believes that one of an XO ' s primary duties is to
act as a buffer between the captain and the crew. "If you
have a hard exec then the captain has to be easy. If you
have a hard captain then it is the exec's job to be easy, so
to speak .
"
The executive officer is probably most influencial in
the area of morale. His policies concerning daily routine,
liberty, request and complaint masts, and inspections can
establish the attitude that the crew comes to work with.
The XO must make a conscious effort to ensure that the
corpsman is doing his job and that the chow aboard the
cutter is up to the expectations of the crew. The XO is,
without a doubt, king of the paperwork empire aboard a ship
but he must realize that it is his drive and concern for the
crew that accounts for the daily pulse of operations.
D. RIGHT PEOPLE HAVE THE RIGHT STUFF
The balance of strengths and weaknesses in a cutter's
organizational personnel is key to whether it will be a
success or failure. The importance of the commanding
officer and the executve officer has already been mentioned
but there are other groups and individuals whose leadership
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and professionalism are just as important. One captain we
interview said, "You can have the world's A-1 commandinq
officer but if his subordinates are of ooor quality he can't
make the difference. He cannot unilaterally raise the unit
up to a point of excellence."
One captain described the influence structure o^ the
different people as a pyramid. The CO is the top, followed
by the executive and engineering officers, then department
heads; until the foundation is reached. This foundation,
upon which the entire structure rests, are the unit's young
petty officers and non-rated personnel. The higher a
position a person holds, the more people he can have an
influence over. A weak level can be supported by strong
adjacent levels unless, that weak level is totally without
substance. The result would be the collapse of the entire
pyramid or in this case, the deteriation of a unit's ability
to complete its missions. "Everyone must make a contribution
to the excellence of a unit, from CO to seaman recuit."
Due to changing technologies and ever increasina
administrative requirements, a great many of the officers
placed emphasis on having a sound wardroom. As one captain
said, "If your officers are good leaders, then they will
bring out the best in the rest of the chain of command. But
if they are not, there's no way you are going to build
yourself a good ship." Should the wardroom question every
order or policy openly, then this discontent v;i 1 1 filter
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down and the unit will eventually be unable to perform to
expectations. The wardroom can hurt a unit faster and
harder than any other group aboard a cutter. As another
captain told us, "So while the wardroom can certainly helo
you, it's even more important that it not hurt you."
Your front line leadership, as always, must come from
the chief petty officers quarter's. What should the CPOs'
leadership role be aboard a cutter? Their role, as one
senior officer put it, is to take "the time and effort to
identify what command policies and qoals are and to suooort
them." The chiefs must "carry that feeling of the tone,
that is set from above, on down into the lower ranks."
Several of the officers reported that one of the first
signs that a unit is having problems is the behavior of the
CPOs. Letters to the district or a group of chiefs
appealing their quarterly marks in writing indicate that a
commanding officer has lost control of the situation aboard
his unit. One salty commander said, "Unrest in the chiefs
mess will stand out like a sore thumb" and can quickly
destroy the morale and proficiency of a vessel. The chiefs
act like a bridge between the officers and the remainder of
the crew. Take away that bridge and the two grouos will
never get together on any matter of importance.
E. A GOOD SHIP LOOKS GOOD
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without hesitation, senior officers said that an
excellent cutter is a good-looking cutter. Their hulls are
free of running rust, fender marks, and battle scars. These
ships proudly exhibited custom dodgers painted with the
unit's name and motto. This attention to details is
especially evident on the quarterdeck. Their quarterdecks
are always clean, the wa tchstanders alert, and the area free
of loitering personnel. One officer related to us that the
excellent ship is the one whose bunting is never in need of
replacement. The excellent units take the time to polish
thier brightwork instead of painting it. The decks are
always polished and the passageways always appear as if they
have been freshly painted. One distinguishing feature of an
excellent cutter will be its messdeck. They are always
brightly painted, tablecloths in place, fresh fruit on the
tables, and there is always one of those ounch dispensers
bubbling away.
The excellent cutters will extend this attention to
details to the manner in which they operate. When entering
of leaving port, the crew will be in their dress uniforms
and manning the rail in a military fashion. On the dock,
you will hear only proper orders being given during docking
and undocking evolutions and not alot of hollering from the
bridge to the 1 inehandlers
. And, as if by magic, the unit's
announcing system will not be blasting away constantly.
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F. TRAINING THE TROOPS
The objective of training within the Coast Guard is to
give its people the abilities to complete their missions
when called to duty. The responsibility to ensure that this
is accomplished rests with the commanding officer. The
difference between an average and an excellent unit is,
according to one officer, "partially a result of the auality
of training aboard it."
It is not uncommon for a unit's training olan to feel
the crunch should the operational schedule need to be
altered. In hindsight, many seniors commented on the need
for this practice to be discontinued and a higher priority
be given to keeping the training schedule intact.
Commanding officers must stress the imoortance of traininq
to their officers, who must in turn transmit this message
down the chain of command. One captain's policy is to "Do
your planned training, do it right, and your job will be
easier and your unit better off."
A past HEC skiDper related to us that he had to commit
himself to a training plan and stick to it. He notified his
training officer that while in standby status his unit would
get underway twice a quarter for training. These trips
involved major preparations and lasted up to five days. '^he
trips were not taken lightly by any member of the crew.
This captain discovered the availability of Navy traininq
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facilities that could be used by his ship at little or no
charge and visited these sites during his scheduled
training periods. He reminded us that, "There are schools,
team trainers, and off-duty programs available but a serious
effort must be made to find them and then use them."
The senior officers reported that excellent ships are
also the ones that have aggressive training programs. The
drills on these unit are not conducted just to fulfill
yearly requirements but to ensure their crews are prepared
to handle an emergency situation. The excellent command
shows some innovation in the design of their drills. A
commander told us of a unit that night drills instead of
routine daytime drills to arouse interest.
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IV. THE VIEW FROM BEHIND A DESK
Next, we asked the senior officers to chanqe their
perspective and tell us what indicators of excellence were
available to them in their staff positions. In clarifying
the question to several officers, we stipulated that they
limit the indicators to those available to them as
operational or administrative commanders. Some examples we
supplied were message traffic, routine administrative
reports, and information from staff conferences.
A small percentage of the officers interviewed felt that
the question could not be accurately answered. Some said
that an evaluation from a desk could not be made with any
reliability, and that most of the data was either rumor or
just what the unit wanted the staff to hear. Some officers
on headquarters and area staffs frankly did not feel close
enough to the fleet to attempt an evaluation. This was
particularly true of those officers who had been away from
the fleet for any length of time. Most officers, esoecialTy
those at the district level, did give some interesting
opinions
.
A. UNTIL THE PAPERWORK IS DONE
If there is something that a sailor who loves the smell
of the salt air hates, it is the command of a desk and the
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paperwork that it takes to keep it afloat. As tedious as it
is, however, paperwork is important. As the gold on the
shoulderboards increases, so does the knowledge that
completed staff work and success go hand in hand.
With the exception of one captain, administrative
reports and messages were considered good indicators of a
unit's performance level. One captain told us that there
was a wealth of such reports and messages, and that
different staff positions used different ones. But no
matter what, the quality and contents of reports are
examined. One officer said that one indicator of a unit's
professionalism is the cruise report. "I'm not looking for
it by the pound. What I'm looking for is the quality of the
report. I'm not looking for how many questions they are
asking the staff, but the kind of recommendations they make
on problems they may have had." Another captain said he
looked at the unit's Officer Performance Reports. As an
indicator, correct and thorough OPRs show the attention to
detail practiced by a unit, as well as how a comoianding
officer percieves his wardroom. Another officer said he
considered a unit's safety report. His contention was that
the better the unit, the less careless injuries he would
find on the report.
Message traffic is one of the most important sources of
information on the perceived level of performance of a unit.
For underway units it is virtually the only source. Many
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officers said that the tone and attitude of messages were
critical in determining its impact. As one captain put it,
"I hate to receive mewling, whining, puking messages from an
underway unit." Senior staff officers agree that they hats
to hear excuses. They do want to be kept informed.
Excellent units do this well. If a unit sends a message
about a problem then the staff wants to see a complete
description of it, parts or assistance needed, and possible
solutions to prevent further occurrences.
But not all officers believed that reports are good
indicators of excellence aboard a cutter. One captain felt
that reports in no way should be used while several others
felt that certain reports were given too much weight and
were not representative of the true performance of a unit.
One such report was that of the District Inspection. One
captain felt that the District Inspector "does not have the
resources available to him, nor the expertise to be an
inspector for anything else but the area of his major
qualification." The inspection team is usually picked from
those personnel not needed at the District Office, and don't
possess the skill, either interpersonal or technical, to
work with the field unit.
B. THE REFTRA " E"
There was almost an even split among the officers
interviewed on the use of Navy Refresher Training as an
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indicator of excellence on Coast Guard cutters. Among those
staff officers that thought Reftra was a useful indicator,
some said that they examined the reports to see if the same
inspection discrepancies appeared as in the previous
reports. Others said they looked for improving scores
during training and if remarks on the crew's attitude were
positive. Senior officers tend to evaluate a unit more on
the preparation and effort than actual scores. As one
admiral put it, "Your report of Refresher training is a
concrete measure of how the ship performed. A particular
ship that has not been in red-hot shape, but comes out doing
well probably is a good unit. Because they are able to pull
together abd get the job done." These officers felt that
the more "E"s on the side of a unit, the better performer
she was.
Other officers told us that Reftra "E"s mean very little
since they are a short term measure. One captain said "E"s
"are an indicator of the level of performance on a given day
at a given location with a given crew, and mean very little
after that." Some officers said that not having "E"s is
sometimes seen as meaning a unit is not excellent. They
felt that this was not fair. Too many ships train just for
Reftra and usually for a short period just prior to
training. Some of these score high but may not be anywhere
near being an excellent cutter. Most officers agreed that a
measure that showed sustained high performance v/ould be more
accurate.
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What the senior officers do agree on is that excellent
ships usually are proud exhibitors of "E's". The awards
themselves do not necessarily indicate that a unit is
excellent but rather that the unit overall is doing
something right.
33
V. YOU HAVE TO WALK THE GROUND
No accurate evaluation of a cutter can be made by an
officer unless he visits the unit. As one officer said,
"You have to walk the ground." Every officer interviewed
felt that this evaluation could be made within a short
period. Some felt that a walk from the quarterdeck to the
wardroom was enough, while others said an entire day aboard
was about right. A captain told us that his evaluation
could be made by observing a unit from reveille to morning
colors. He said that his evaluation was seldom far off the
mark. Some officers confessed that their feelings could be
incorrect based on just one visit. They occasionally
evaluated a unit as a weak sister only to find out they were
wrong later, but this was not usually the case. We did not
find anyone who, once they made the evaluation of a unit as
excellent, later changed their minds based on further
information
.
A. NO RUST, NO PROBLEM
A point of total agreement among the officers was that
an excellent ship was always a clean ship. These units
always washed down prior to entering port, and didn't look
like a disaster area during drydocking. Their maintenance
procedures do not include the practice of painting over rust
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or failing to complete proper preparation before painting.
It is worth repeating that no officer knew of any dirty
vessel that was known as an excellent cutter. They admit
that, in theory, it was possible, but not likely. There are
times when even the best vessels look poorly. A captain
commented, "There's an exception to everything. You have to
ask yourself, what have they been doing? Are they a busy
unit? You must be able to judge a situation."
The first impression during an informal visit usually
contributes more to the opinion that an offficer holds
concerning a unit's excellence than does a formal
inspection. Most of the officers interviewed said that they
started their evaluation while on the dock. A good unit
recognizes that garbage or supplies piled all over the dock
detracts from the unit's appearance. They looked at the
cleanliness of the brow and quarterdeck, as well as the
appearance and attitude of the wa tchstanders . These first
few minutes were considered by many to be critical to the
judgement of a unit.
The berthing areas are also an excellent indicator of
the state of a unit. Clean berthing areas probably show
that daily inspections are conducted. It illustrates that
the command cares how its people live, and that the crew
themselves have the discipline and pride to keep their
living spaces clean.
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Several officers gained an impression about a unit from
its wardroom. Poor signals are when a wardroom is full of
spare parts, the furniture needs repair, and the bulkheads
have not been painted since commissioning. A good unit will
have a bright, clean professional wardroom. One officer
told us that there was a sense of tradition in the wardrooms
of excellent units. He said, "They will be using china and
silver and not eating off trays from the mess deck. Meals
will be served on time with the amenities being observed.
On an excelent unit, the wardroom is a place of which an
officer can be proud."
The work spaces aboard a unit will tell a visitor about
the attitudes of the different departments and if "the
divisions are consistent around the ship?" One senior
officer told us that he could accurately predict the
operational record of a cutter by the materiel condition of
the engineering spaces. If the engine room is painted and
free of oil, the bilges dry, the deckplates clean, and the
tools properly stowed, then the unit will probably have less
than its share of unscheduled down-time. A clean set of
engineering spaces show pride and committment to something
more than an eight hour workday or a five day work week.
B. LOOK SHARP, BE SHARP
The military bearing of the crew stood out in the
interviews as an indicator of a cutter's excellence. One
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officer look to see if " everybody was wearing the uniform
of the day?" The senior officers felt that the appearance
of the crew reflected the attitude of the command. If a
unit requires that its personnel comply with established
standards, they will have the tendency to function in other
areas with the same attention to detail.
This pertains not only to uniform and groominq
standards, but to the knowledge and use of military customs
and courtesies. On an excellent ship, salutes nre given
when appropriate and in a proper manner. The quarterdeck
watchstander s know when and how to render honors. On an
excellent cutter, the color detail is well trained, and
colors are never late.
The crew of an excellent cutter will carry this behavior
off the ship as well. As one officer relates, "They wear
the sharpest uniforms even in the exchange, and never fail
to render a salute and sound off a greeting." The crew will
dress in an appropriate manner and seldom behave in such a
manner as to embarass themselves or their command. They
live not only by the rules but by their spirit, also.
C. WE'RE NUMBER ONE
The officers and men of an excellent unit display a
positive attitude about their command and themselves. They
are never ashamed to tell other sailors what ship they are
on. It is this sense of pride in ones unit that separate
the good from the bad units.
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officers visiting a unit observe the enthusiasm with
which they are greeted. Does the individual expell a sense
of "This is my ship, we're good, welcome aboard."? Does the
sailor stand tall and look you straight in the eye when he
is being spoken to? On a unit that has its act together,
they will. They are glad to be stationed on that vessel and
will gladly tell you why. The crew will have a feeling of
accomplishment in the operational record of their unit. A
senior officer will become concerned if during a meeting
with a crew no questions or the wrong questions are being
asked. After twenty plus years of service, most senior
officers have heard all the questions and are capable of
recognizing which questions mean trouble.
D. DOWN TO THE SEA
Well, that is what the senior officers had to say about
"excellence in the surface Coast Guard". From their
experiences they provided us with what attributes were
exhibited by excellent cutters. They stressed leadership in
the commanding officer, dedicated personnel, and getting the
job done. From their positions as administrative and
operational commanders, senior officers rely on
administrative reports and messages to evaluate the
performance of a ship. When they visited an excellent ship,
they found it clean and well maintained, a sharp looking
crew, and a strong sense of unit pride.
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We explained to the officers that we next wanted to
visit several excellent units to observe how they operate.
We requested that they recommend units that they felt were
excellent. The next five chapters is our story of a day in
the life of an excellent cutter.
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VI. IN THE FLEET
They really are out there-- the excellent cutters. If
you were lucky enough to have been assigned aboard one then
you know what it's like; the well trained professional crew
that is fiercely proud, the bridge wing covered with awards
and "E"s, the mast stencilled with victory emblems, and the
engineroom so clean "..it could be mistaken for the mess
deck." Perhaps it sounds too good to be true, but cutters
like that do exist in the fleet.
Before we continue, however, there is the matter of how
we chose which cutters to visit. As we have said before, we
had no generally recognized set of objective measures that
we could use to evaluate our population of cutters. This
left us with really only one criterion: the subjective
recommendations made when we asked the senior officers to
name cutters in the HEC/MEC classes that fit their own
vision of excellence.
Some officers, especially those in headquarters
positions, felt that they could not name excellent cutters
because they were too far away from the action. Most others
named cutters within their district or area, although
several were able to make recommendations across
area/district boundaries due to their recent transfers. In
total twelve different cutters were named, but only five
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cutters received three or more nominations. These became
our Phase II interview targets. VJe could not arrange
interviews with all five cutters due to conflicts between
their operational commitments and our academic schedules,
and time and money constraints. In the end, we were able to
spend time aboard two excellent cutters.
Each visit began about 21900, and we spent at least eight
hours on each cutter. As in Phase I, our primary data
collection technique was the individual and group
unstructured interview. However, we did make a conscious
attempt to observe the people and the events happening
around us during our visits. A typical day began with an
hour-long interview with the commanding officer, another
hour with the executive officer, and a tour of the vessel
followed by lunch in the wardroom. After lunch, we had
separate hour-long interviews with the following groups: 4-
6 officers(W-2 to 0-3), 4-6 chief petty of f icer s (E-7) , ^-5
first class petty of f icers (E-6) , and 4-6 junior enlisted
personnel (E-5 to E-2). The interviews were structured to be
low-key and open-ended so that as many people as possible
would have a chance to talk. We tried to avoid questions
that could be answered by a simple "yes" or "no". For
example, we asked such questions as "What do you like best
about working around here?" , "What is the CO's command
philosophy?", or "Is this an excellent cutter? If so, why?".
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In addition to these type of questions, we also used
ones we had developed from our interviews with the senior
officers. Exact questions depended on the individual or
group being interviewed, but we covered such items as the
relationship between the CO and the XO, the relationship
between the wardroom and the CPO mess, attitudes of the
crew, appearance of the ship and crew, task accomplishment,
discipline, and morale.
What did the excellent cutters tell us? Once we had
completed a cutter visit, we analyzed the data and listed
the attributes of that unit. We then compared the lists of
attributes so that we could identify the items that were
repeated. These repeat items are what we considered to be
the most important factors. They represent the
commonalities that we saw at work on the excellent cutters.
We realize that our limited sample of two cutters may have
prevented us from seeing other common factors that may also
be present aboard excellent cutters. However, we do think
that our findings are significant, and are of interest to
personnel of the surface operations fleet.
For the sake of convenience we broke the factors down
into discrete chapters, but that isn't how it really is.
Everthing is related to everything else. The CO's emphasis
on developing subordinates is related to the excellent
training programs we saw, and the pride in evidence is
related to the concern for people attitude. Tn the next
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four chapters we will present what we found. But in a




* CONNECTED WITH THE SHIP
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VII. THE CAPTAIN IS THE DRIVER
On the excellent ships we visited, the man in the
driver's seat was the commanding officer. This may seem a
statement of the obvious, since it is the function of the CO
to guide the operations of his ship. But on board the
excellent cutters, the impact of the CO was tremendously
pervasive. In virtually every facet of the ship's
operation, he set the tone. Almost every person or group we
interviewed, from the XO down to the seaman recruit, said in
strong terms that the CO was the main force driving the ship
and themselves to perform well. One first class petty
officer, when asked to pick the most important factor in the
ship's success, said, "..it all goes back to the CO. He is
there and he leads by example." On another cutter, a third
class quartermaster said, "It's like we're working with him
for our ship." A LTJG said, "I think in large measure, the
captain is responsible for the success of the unit as a
whole. ..."
The COs we interviewed realized that they had the
ability and the responsibility to provide direction and
meaning to their officers and crew. They all had concrete
ideas of what it took to do this. However, their leadership
styles were not the same. One captain was characterized by
his XO as a strong traditionalist, formal in his
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relationships with the officers and crew, taking his meals
alone, etc. Another captain used a much more relaxed and
personal approach. But these surface features just masked
the underlying similarities they shared. We noticed that
they all placed a great deal of emphasis on virtually the
same list of techniques such as communicating their
standards by actions as well as words, being out and about,
and relying on the executive officer. More important was
the fact that they shared the same approach in three broad
areas. We've called them: mission accomplishment, developing
subordinates, and connected to the crew. Rather than
present a list of the management techniques we saw being
used, we decided to talk about these broad areas.
A. MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT
The commanding officers unanimously said that
consistently meeting(and sometimes exceeding) their
operational commitments was at the heart of their command
philosophy. There were two reasons for this. First, they
saw it as the bottom line. Accomplishing the various tasks
such as search and rescue and law enforcement is what the
taxpayers are paying for. Second, the captains recognized
that mission accomplishment is the gauge by which they and
their rjtter are measured by their superiors. They conceded
that this might not always be fair, but it is the way the
game was played. Although they felt a very strong personal
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responsibility to ensure the missions were accomplished in a
bristol fashion, their main concern was that the officers
and crew shared their understanding and commitment to
getting the job done.
The first and best tool that the commanding officers
used to meet their concerns was proper planning. They said
they repeatedly stressed to their people the importance of
staying ahead of the action and practicing forehandedness in
every way. On the excellent cutters, this planning
environment was obvious at all levels. For example, on one
cutter we found that a written plan had been promulgated
concerning our visit. It was thorough, flexible enough to
allow for the inevitable glitches, and people knew about it.
A first class petty officer we asked about this said it was
normal to do this, that "if you really plan out something,
like changing heads on diesels, and something goes wrong so
that only half of your plan is any good--well, you're still
ahead of the game by 50 percent." One XO put it succintly:
"...the seven P's come into play, proper prior olanning
prevents piss poor performance. If he emphasizes anything
else to me, that's what it is."
Another powerful tool that the COs used was the
insistence that every job, no matter how small, be done
thoroughly. They were sticklers that the details be done
right. On one cutter, a LTJG called it, "...holding people
to completing a job thoroughly." A CPO said that "The CO
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expects every man down the chain of command to do their job.
He expects professionalism."
B. DEVELOPING SUBORDINATES
The COS were unanimous in their belief that one of their
primary tasks was to develop their subordinates. One CO
said, "I have only two goals: mission accomplishment, and
training of my junior personnel." This applied especially
to his junior officers. One CO said, "...it's important
that they(junior officers) be competent in seamanship and
leadership when they leave here...."
To the COS of the excellent cutters, developing their
subordinates begins with the recognition that people are
different-- that some are more capable than others. A LT
summarized the attitude: "...people are not general i zed--
those that can handle more are given more."
The first thing they are given is a clear chain of
command. On all the cutters, great emphasis was put on
making the chain of command a viable tool for supervision
and communications. In an interview with the first-class
petty officers on one cutter, they stated that a working
chain of command was critical to their success. One likened
the chain of command to a cutter's hull. The hull keeps the
cutter afloat, and allows the work to be accomplished. If
one link in the chain is not working, it is like a crack in
the hull. The longer the crack is left alone, the bigger it
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will get, until the hull fails and the ship sinks. The
metaphor may be mixed, but the meaning is clear.
The CD's felt that subordinates must also be given the
freedom to perform their jobs. They felt that there were
two ways to do this. First, the subordinates must
understand that they are accountable for the work they do.
On one cutter, a LT said, "...it's really a remarkable
character istic--he' s also willing to take what you give him,
as long as it's thorough ., .he will give you the right to
produce work for him on your level." The second part of
this freedom is that although the CO has the ultimate
responsibility for success, their subordinates must be
allowed to make mistakes. The balance is a fine one, and as
one CO said, "I have to be willing to take the heat." A LT
called the resulting atmosphere, "...a non-threatening
environment." Another said, "...(officers) are not afraid
to make decisions--they' re not afraid to take on a task
fearing that if they don't do well, something is going to
happen to them adversely."
The final aspect of developing subordinates has a lot to
do with the training program. The excellent ships
constantly searched for training opportunities outside the
ship, especially "C" schools or specialized training
schools, for both individuals and groups. They would send
personnel off for training even if it meant that the ship
sailed short on deployment. A lot of people we talked to
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mentione'^ this fact, but no one seeme<i upset at having to
pull extra weight. One seaman told us that he knew his
chance v;as coming.
C. CONNECTED WITH THE SHIP
A commander that we interviewed during Phase T said he
thought that the CO of an excellent ship would be "connected
to the crew." He explained that he meant the CO considered
the ship, the crew and himself to be an integral unit; that
the CO had an "our ship" rather than a "my ship" attitude.
The result would be a CO who had unobstructed two-way
communications with the officers and crew, and whose
policies and programs were understood by them.
We certainly saw this on board the excellent units. It
was most clearly manifested in the COs' relationship with
the XO, officers, and crew. One captain stated that he felt
the open working relationship he had established with the
wardroom was critical to the ship's success. He believed
that if he was able to bring his wardroom on board by
understanding his philosophy of command, then the impact of
his policies and programs would be strengthened and
broadened. And the wardrooms seemed to respond to that
atmosphere. One LTJG said, "The CO is a shipmate." On the
other ship, a LTJG said, "He eats in the wardroom so we can
talk to him. We have an open relationship with the CO, but
he's still the CO."
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The CO worked to foster his philosophy at all
levels. During the course of a working day, he moved
around and talked to everybody he met. Almost unanimously,
those we interviewed said that the CO was personable and
approachable. A CPO told us that the CO visited the chief's
mess at least once every day to have a cup of coffee and
talk over the day's events. This same CO also said that he
made it a point to visit the mess deck and lounges
informally to talk with his crew. The COs were alert for
any opportunity to get the word out to the crew. Tn addition
to the usual methods of plan of the day and quarters, they
used other, less traditional methods. On one cutter, a
seaman said that when the ship was involved in boarding
operations, the CO was constantly on the ship's announcing
system telling those not directly involved about what was
going on.
D. ALSO, THE XO
Many of the senior officers we interviewed in Phase I
said that they believed the XO would be a key player on an
excellent cutter. We certainly found this to be true.
However, on both excellent cutters, the influence of the XO
was tied to the command philisophy of the CO. Because there
was such a very strong, positive relationship between the CO




On board the excellent cutters, there is a clear
differentiation between the role of the XO an^^ that of the
CO, and there is effective integration in the CO/XO team.
The CO let the XO run the ship's daily routine and take care
of the normal administration. One XO said, "He(the CO) can
do anything he wants, but he lets me do my job. I just keep
him informed." This practice of "keeping the Old Man
informed" was the second aspect of the CO/XO relationship.
There seemed to be a good deal of effective communications
going on between the two.
This rapport was key in what we saw as one of the XvO ' s
most important tasks. On board both of the excellent
cutters, the XO is the great implementer. He is responsible
for transferring broad policy guidance into workable
programs that fit the Plan of the Day. One XO used a
navigation metaphor to describe this process. He likened
the CO to the ship's navigator; responsible for determining
the course and speed necessary to get the ship to its
destination. He then communicates his plan to the OODs by
laying tracklines down on the navigational charts. The XO
is like the OOD, who must steer courses and soeeds to make
good the tracklines. Like the OOD who provides feedback to
the navigator on the ship's progress, the XO is constantly
providing feedback to the CO on the progress of his policies
and programs.
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Viri. THE UNIT FAMILY
The excellent cutters we visited possessed a stronq
family feeling. By this we mean that the people we talked
to had a strong sense of identity with the unit and seemed
to care about what happened to others in the crew. This
meant not only official concern by the chain of command, but
also a close personal concern for each other. In fact, it
was often hard to distinguish one from the other. Although
not everyone felt that their command cared enough about them
and their job, most felt that they and the job they did were
appreciated by the various levels in the chain of command.
This was no accident. Although they gave a top priority
to getting the operational mission done, the COs of the
excellent cutters had a definite people orientation. They
recognized that the ship's missions were accomplished
through the hard work and commitment of the crew. One CO
said that "A ship is only steel and people breathe life into
it. You must pay attention to their needs on a personal
basis." In order to perform their task in an excellent
manner, a crew had to be more than a collection of
individuals who happened to be doing a lot of different jobs
on the same 378-foot length of steel. A crew needed a
strong sense of unified purpose, and to these COs this meant
family. One CO said that he felt that a person in the Coast
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Guard had a personal family, a unit family, and a Coast
Guard family. A person could not be an effective oart of
his unit family until his personal family needs were secure.
A. CONCERN FOR THE CREW
This family feeling began even before a new person
arrived. On the excellent cutters, the sponsor program
worked. By the time a new person walked on board, he was
already considered a member of the crew. On one ship, the
CO presented the new crew member with a unit ball can at
quarters as a symbol that he belonged. He said that it
literally "puts everybody out at quarters under the same
hat. ..."
This intense concern began with the CO. It went farther
than the CO walking about daily or conducting the weekly
zone inspections. It involved actively looking for ways to
improve living conditions. One CO was appalled by the
condition of the berthing areas when he relieved;
compartments smelled, lockers were in poor shape, paintwork
was old and chipped, and there was no privacy. He arranged
self-help funding, and the berthing areas were completely
rehabilitated by the crew. when we visited, these berthing
areas were spotless, and the people living in them were
proud to show us where they lived. On this same cutter, the
CO believed that the quality of chow was one of the best
measures of this feeling. He had gone to great lengths to
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improve the quality of both the food and the service. This
entailed arranging for special training for the ships cooks
at commercial restaurants, visits by subsistence specialist
assistance teams from both the Coast Guard and the Navy, and
constant suggestions from the crew on ways to improve.
Every person we talked to on this cutter commented on the
great job that their cooks were doing. Most said that they
hoped we could eat lunch to see what they meant. We did.
The lunch was an outstanding -neal, one of the best either of
us has ever eaten on any ship.
The caring and concern was visible at other levels in
the command, too. Most people felt that the example set by
the CO was worth following. One first class petty officer
said, "He(the CO) cares, so you care." A LTJG told us that
watching the CO and XO work had shown him what "taking care
of your troops" really means.
B. FAMILY SUPPORT
A strong family support program was in effect on the
excellent cutters. It wasn't just a paperwork issue,
either. As a CO told us, "It's difficult enough being
aboard here without having to worry about your family while
you're gone...." Again, it all began with the sponsor
program. A family was contacted long before they came to
the area. On one cutter, a close liason was maintained with
a local Air Force base housing office to help make
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arrangements for new families. When they arrived in the
area, they were met by their sponsor who had arranged for
temporary lodging and who helped them get settled. Although
the system wasn't perfect, the vast majority of people we
interviewed said it helped them.
The support program didn't stop there, however. On one
cutter, the CO held regular meetings with the crew's wives.
These usually included a luncheon and presentations by the
department heads on the ship's upcoming deployment. Another
cutter sponsored a party or picnic during the inport
periods. The most recent one, a buffet dinner served on the
flight deck at sunset, was still being talked about. The
excellent cutters produced a newsletter to keep the families
informed. On one cutter, it took the form of a ship's
newspaper, including photographs and stories about some of
the crew. One E6 said that his wife felt "...it filled a
little bit of the emptiness."
Another part of the program was the support network
fostered among the families. Usually centered around a
telephone contact list, the network helped them stay in
touch when the ship was deployed, acting as a communication
network so that news of the ship or any emergencies among
the families could be exchanged quickly. One CO told us
about the time one of the wives broke three ribs roller
skating with her children. Several other wives took turns
caring for the children while she was recovering, and
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arranged babysitting when she had to go to the doctor, and
generally cared for the family until she recovered.
C. COOPERATION AND TEAMWORK
The excellent cutters displayed a unique sense of
cooperation and teamwork in carrying out the mission. Tn
almost every group of people we interviewed, someone said
something like, "Everyone likes one another." Most spoke of
being considerate of others and a strong sense of
camraderie. A LTJG said it was a "mutual self-respect from
all elements of the ship--so that the people meld together
nicely." On both ships, the wardroom and the CPO mess
seemed to enjoy a good working relationship based this
feeling. One CPO told us that he felt comfortable working
with the officers because they listened to what the CPOs had
to say. On the same ship, an ENS said that junior officers
were not terrorized because they were inexperienced, but
that the CPOs were always helpful in solving problems.
One CO said that his attitude is that everyone is
equally responsible for each other. A LT, talking about the
planning operations that went on during a law enforcement
deployment, said, "It's definitely not a one person show--
it's a team effort." He told us that the CO would hold
daily briefings, which he called his braintrust meetings,
and talk over the coming days' plan. These meetings were
open and free flowing exchanges of information and opinion.
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If the CO liked what an LTJG said, then that LTJG might end
up running tracklines and planning the operation. Also, the
Operations officer told us that it was not unusual for
lookouts or quartermasters to come to him or other OODs with
suggestions and ideas on future operations. On the other
cutter, there was a distinct bias for the term "working
together". The best example of this was the washdown prior
to docking at homeport . This evolution involved washing
down the topside areas of the ship with fresh water. After
three or four weeks underway, getting this expanse of white
paint clean can be quite a chore. But everyone from the CO
down to the boot seaman and fireman is involved.
A LTJG noted that there was a lack of the intense
infighting that sometimes goes on among departments and
divisions aboard ship. A good example of this was the work
done by the operations department in cleaning and repainting
the quarterdeck in the portside air castle. This area was
normally the responsibility of the deck department. It
needed work badly, and because the deck department was
shorthanded and overworked, the OPS department took over the
job so that the ship would keep looking good.
Much of this strong sense of unit identity, of family,
carried over into the fierce pride we saw on the excellent
units. In the next chapter we cover the topic of pride.
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IX. PRIDE AT ALL LEVELS
"I would match (this ship) against any cutter in the
Coast Guard," one CPO said. "We are damn good," said an
LTJG. The pride in evidence on board the excellent units
was intense. Tne COs were, of course, proud of their
commands, but they told us to talk to the crew. In our
interviews with crew members, when we asked them if they
were excellent, most were quick to say that their ship was
the best high or medium endurance cutter in the fleet, and
some said that they were the best in the Coast Guard. This
consensus cut across all rank boundaries. The seaman were
just as adamant in their belief as the officers or chiefs.
Out of the approximately fifty officers and enlisted men
that we interviewed, only one said he had seen a better
ship
.
A CPO told us, "The ship radiates pride both in
themselves and in the ship." On the excellent cutters,
pride in the unit began with the individual crew members.
It stemmed from each person being confident in his own
skills and in having the ability to accomplish his assigned
tasks. If they possessed this self-confidence, they woud be
able to express their pride in unit. One CO said he saw it
as a matter of "...starting with an individual pride in
doing a good job." It was the responsibility of every
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supervisor to first foster this self-pride. Only then could
unit pride follow from the accomplishment of unit missions.
A. RECOGNITION AND AWARDS
How were the supervisors on the excellent cutters able
to elicit this fiercely loyal pride we saw? The first and
best tool was recognizing good performance and rewarding it
in the correct way. On both the excellent cutters, it was a
stated goal of the commanding officer to make sure that good
performance was officially recognized and rewarded. On both
cutters, official awards were given frequently. One CPO
stated that his ship was the most awarded cutter he had ever
seen. On the other cutter the people still mentioned a
story about the number of awards given to an entire boarding
party for a certain case. They said events such as that
showed them that the command realized that everyone involved
in such an operation was to some degree responsible for its
success, and were awarded appropriately. This is not to say
that awards were given frivolously at every opportunity.
But the excellent commands seemed to use the award system
very frequently to recognize their good performers.
Awards ceremonies were used not only to present official
awards, but also as a time for recognition of other
accomplishments, such as advancements, education course
completions, watch qualification, and Seaman of the Quarter
award. On one cutter, the ship bought rating pins for
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personnel being advanced and cuttermen pins for those
meeting the permanent qualifications, and presented them
during the awards ceremonies. On another cutter,
meritorious masts were frequently held to recognize
individual performance. The people we talked to appreciated
being singled out as winners by the command.
Recognition of good performance was not done just at
special ceremonies. Nor was it restricted to recognition
given only by the CO or XO, either. It seemed to be an
everyday, on-the-spot affair practiced by those in all
levels of the chain of command. The COs told us that they
stressed the use of simple praise for a job well done.
Their supervisors had apparently taken the lesson to heart.
One LTJG said that he tried to find at least one thing every
day to praise about everyone in his division. At first it
was hard, but the more he practiced, the easier it became.
B. THE BAD WITH THE GOOD
Just as good performance was recognized, poor
performance was also given attention. Although on one
cutter, captain's masts were open, most other negative
recognition was kept private. One CO said that it was
important to show the crew that substandard performance
would not be tolerated. Those personnel that performed
poorly were counseled, and records kept of the event. If
they continued to give poor performance, then the command
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began to question whether this person could be oart of the
team. The poor performer was given a chance to meet the
standards, but continued failure to do so usually meant that
he did not remain on the ship very long.
We are not saying that the commands were headhunting.
They seemed genuinely interested in bringing everyone on
board, as we said in Chapter VIII. But it was a matter of
not wasting valuable time and other resources on "dirtbags".





Although neither commanding officer talked specifically
about consistent management, it was clear from the other
things they talked about that they believed in it. By this
we don't mean that they treated everyone the same or that
they never broke their own rules. We mean that the command
philosophy had been clearly defined, policies and programs
were in effect. Most people felt that they were in control
of the situation. "The only problems we have are things we
dont't have control over. Like the operational schedule,"
said one first class petty officer. There appeared to be
little wasted effort and "herky- jerky" management was not
the norm. The crews felt that this gave them an edge on
other ships, and was a big reason that they were so
successful. Just as Gullickson and Chenette ( 19?^4 ) found in
the Navy, most of the time the ship was in automatic.
The areas we've already talked about, such as the COs'
philosophy of planning or the command concern for people,
are good examples of the consistent management approach.
Because we felt that they were the more important attributes
of excellence, we organized them into separate chapters. In
this chapter, we've grouped together various policies and
programs that also illustrate this approach.
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A. TRAINING AND EDUCATION
The excellent cutters heavily emphasize continual
training and education. This is partly a result of the
people concern and the desire to develop subordinates. To
the COS the ships' training program was a very high
priority. One XO said, "The CO stresses it. ..the ship's
philosophy is that we will take advantage of sufficient
training opportunities to keep the ship ready--and then
some." He said this policy was tied to meeting the personal
goals of the crew as well as the readiness goals of the
ship.
Training was an everday evolution. It was routinely
scheduled and was carried out, even though both XOs wished
that Murphy's Law could be repealed^. Many people said that
they would like to see more training, but most felt that the
majority of training was worthwhile. On one of the cutters,
we were told that the qualification board, which reviewed
applicants for all major wa tchstand ing positions, v;as
responsible for ensuring that the training was
2The XO corollary to Murphy's Law says that five minutes
before a scheduled training period, one of three things will
happen: 1) A slight breeze will suddenly reach hurricane
force, or 2) a SAR case involving the governor's daughter
will develop, or 3) a real fire will break out in the
seaman's head. The training will be cancelled. The
Yeoman's addendum to the XO corollary says that the POD
scheduling the training will be the one that the yeoman
retyped at 02C1PI in the morning.
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appropriate. Proper planning was an essential part of
internal training, too. One engineering officer told us
that the XO required a well thought out plan for drills and
training evolutions, and would not tolerate the spur of the
moment, "lets have a fire drill" operation.
The excellent cutters sent a lot of people to external
schools and training, even if it meant the ship sailed short
during a deployment. An engineer on one of the cutters told
us that on a recent deployment the ship sailed missing three
engineering watch officers because they were attending
school. A lot of people felt that most ships would not send
people to schools because they were needed to stand watches.
As qualified people were transferred, this resulted in less
qualified watchstanders , who could not be sent to school,
either. The result was a low level of training among all
watchstanders. Somehow, the excellent cutters had broken
the vicious circle and were able to train their people.
B. DISCIPLINE
On the excellent cutters, discipline was traditionally
handled. Although one CO said that he preferred to use
positive measures and act before disciplinary problems
occurred, he believed strongly in using a clear chain of
command. One XO called it the "percolation system".
Authority for dealing with disciplinary problems was
delegated as far down the chain of command as possible. The
64
petty officer would handle problems and only if necessary
percolate them upward to higher levels. The intent was two-
fold; to qet the solution as close to the problem as
supervisory skill allowed, and to preserve the time and
effort of the people higher up in the chain One cutter,
which characterized its disciplinary problems as minor, said
that this system went as far down as the E4-E5 level. The
other cutter, which called their disciplinary problem
moderate, indicated their primary level for handling
problems was the E6-E7 level.
C. IT LOOKS GOOD AND IT WORKS
The excellent cutters looked excellent. One cutter we
visited had just returned from a three week deployment and
looked as if it was ready for a district inspection. The
other cutter was preparing for a major yard period, but the
the interior was clean and the quarterdeck looked
outstanding. The crew took pride in the condition and
cleanliness of their ships and they worked to maintain and
improve it. A large placard in the engine room control
booth exemplified this attitude; "CLEANLINESS--A Main
Propulsion Tradition". Looking as good as the ship were the
officers and crew. They were sharp. The leadershio-by-
example principle was at work here. We heard some people
say that if the CO or the CPOs could look good, then they
could, too. It was definitely a matter of pride that if
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someone left the cutter he was in A-1 condition to uphold
the reputation of the ship.
The weekly zone inspections played an important oart in
fostering this attitude. Although as subject to the XO
corollary as training schedules, both the COs and the XOs we
talked to said they were critical to keeping the ship in
good condition. They considered it a good way to
communicate their standards to those involved in the actual
work. One cutter made it a point to involve junior officers
and CPOs in the zone inspections.
As important as inspections in communicating standards
of cleanliness and materiel condition was the routine day to
day attention given it by all concerned. Sweepdowns and
washdowns on these cutters was not a trivial, end of the day
activity. Also, the CO's policy of being out and about
amounted to a series of mini-inspections in many respects.
Both XOs said they tried to make daily tours to keep up to
date, and they required their department heads to do so.
Maintenance on the excellent cutters mirrored this
attitude, also. The COs told us that they considered a
sound maintenance program absolutely required if they were
going to be successful. The overall attitude was "fix it
now". The maintenance philosophy on one cutter was to get
the job done right the first time, because there wasn't
going to be enough time to do it over. Several engineers
told us of their ship's 95-98 percent PMS completion rate,
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at the same time letting us know that the fleet average was
only 70-75 percent. The engineering CPOs on one cutter
proudly told us "...we do PMS—we're sticklers for
maintenance ."
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XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
For three months we traveled around, interviewing senior
staff officers and the officers and men of cutters. Through
these interviews, it was revealed to us that Coast Guard
leaders agree that policies are structured from the top and
that excellent cutters do exist.
When we started our Phase I research, we did not
appreciate the seriousness with which senior officers of
operational backgrounds approach the subject of excellence
in the surface Coast Guard. The impact that past surface
experiences has had on these officers came through in the
answers that they gave us. They made it clear to us that
they hoped their inputs would benefit future seafaring
officers. Junior officers sometimes forget that when a
senior officer recommends a course of action, he speaks from
experience and is attempting to prevent them from making the
same mistakes he made or saw others make. We were not
astonished by the attributes that they felt must be
exhibited by a vessel to be classified as excellent in their
minds. Nor were we shocked at what they told us they looked
for as evaluators of excellence. From the first day a
junior officer reports aboard a ship, he is taught to ensure
his area of responsibility is kept clean and his troops look
sharp. It is a sort of conditioning process in which an
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officer climbs each rung of the experience ladder until he
has acquired the necessary tools to become a molder of
policy himself. For us, the data resulted in a picture of
what it takes to make the grade as seen through the eyes of
officers who have already made it. What impressed us was
that there was so much agreement among the seniors about
what was important and what an excellent cutter looked like.
Chapters III-V can be viewed as offering future shipboard
officers a set of guidelines for achieving a successful
tour. This information can provide a sort of guide by which
a new CO can prioritize the activities of his unit. A good
example of this phenomenon is the young patrol boat skipper.
Usually a LTJG with less than two years of active service,
his experience is limited to that of a division officer.
His performance during this time was guided by his
department head or the executve officer. Because of limited
experience, the young skipper's top concern becomes the safe
and successful completion of operational missions. This is
where the emphasis has been placed up to this ooint in his
career. What the young officer fails to realize is that
doing well in just operational duties is not enough. That
there are other factors important in a commanding officer.
He must practice management techniques that are best suited
to his situation. He must comprehend the importance of the
timely completion of routine manners such as admin reports
or training. He must learn what is expected of him and how
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to balance these requirements so as to impress his
competence on his superiors.
From our interviews we have identified what attributes
senior officers believe are exhibited by an excellent
cutter. Without a doubt, the commanding officer sets the
tone of his vessel. The unit can only reach the goal
communicated by the CO. That the unit must be functioning
at such a level that it is capable of successfully
completing its operational missions. Not just under
ordinary but also extraordinary circumstances. That a unit
cannot achieve a an upper plateau of performance without the
dedication and cooperation of the unit's management
personnel, A critical member of these key management
personnel is the executive officer. It is a position that
must be filled by an officer with the basic qualifications
to do the job. An excellent ship has a comprehensive
training plan. Its training is accomplished with the same
professionalism that dedication of any primary mission. And
finally, that an excellent unit exhibits a sense of pride; a
feeling that they are the best and will strive to remain the
best. This is always accompanied by a vessel that is clean
and a crew that is sharp in military bearing and in the way
they conduct themselves.
In concluding our interviews, we asked the senior
officers if they could name any vessels that met their
description of excellence. Many units were mentioned. The
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seniors gave us the impression that there are alot of
cutters in the Coast Guard doing a fine job and that their
numbers are constantly increasing. They pointed out that
only a small percentage of these vessels were the embodiment
of excellence. Five ships of the HEC and MEC classes were
repeatedly mentioned. We visited two.
Enroute our first excellent shio, we had wondered about
what we would find. Both of us had been lucky enough to
have served on excellent ships, so we had our own opinions
on the matter. We expected no real surprises. The positive
atmosphere and attitude on each of the ships was
overwhelming. The officers and men of these units were
anxious to talk to us about their ship. Their pride shone
through when declaring that their unit was the best in the
fleet. From our visits aboard them, we identified what we
felt were attributes of excellence.
The most obvious attribute in an excellent unit is
superior commanding Jtficer. His leadership abilities,
expectations, and involvement are reflected in the
outstanding performance of his command. The commanding
officers and their crews demonstrated a belief the their
unit was always prepared to complete their mission. They
talked of outstanding patois that were accomplished through
teamwork and commitment by the crew to achieving excellence.
Professional development in subordinates was a key theme
board excellent units. The CO's enforced this theme bya
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example. They allowed their officers the flexibility '^o a
job to the best of their abilities. But, they held their
officers responsible for completing assignments at their
individual levels of proficiency. This feeling of trust was
especially evident in the relationships of commanding and
executive officers. One philosophy of these ships is that
excellence cannot be achieved without the essential
ingredients of training and education. A climate of being a
family existed aboard the cutters. Above all else, they
were vessels that took care of their own. This concern for
ones shipmate extended off the ship in the form of support
activities for the families of crew members. The excellent
ships accentuated the positive. Efforts were made to reward
a job well done and captain's masts were most often held to
present awards and not for punishment. The excellent ships
were sharp in appearance and materially sound and their
crews took a great deal of pride in this. It was if the
excellent ships thought with just one brain and more
importantly one heart.
These were no real surprises. We found what the senior
officers predicted we would find: simply the basic tenets of
good management and leadership being practiced in a
consistent manner with common sense. But two facts in
particular struck us First, the excellent cutters were
excellent at accomplishing their missions, but behind this
was a genuine concern for people and a positive teamwork
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attitude at work. Secondly, there is no doubt that the
commanding officer is the most critical element in a
cutter's success. This may seem an obvious statement, but
we can't say it too often. The commanding officer's
personality and behavior are a constant model for the entire
ship. As many people told us: "As is the commanding
officer, so is the ship". Officers aspiring for command
must understand this fact.
What we saw operating in the fleet agrees with the
various theories of management that we have learned in our
career. We met commanding officers who realized that their
personnel had specific needs that had to be fulfilled. They
operated their units so as to satisfy the hierarchy of needs
as described by Maslow. The captains of both cutters we
visited are firm believers in McGregor's Theory Y
management. They believed that their crews are not by
nature lazy and unreliable; rather, they can be self-
directed and creative in their work. This was the same
attitude voiced by the senior officers in the Phase I
interviews. Management by objectives is practiced on the
excellent cutters. Neither commanding officer referred to
the concept by its name. But both COs established goals and
communicated them to their people in such a way that they
became the common goals of the units. Subordinate officers
set departmental goals consistent with command goals.
Individuals were held accountable for their work and
73
performance was measured against the established standards.
Whether learned from formal training or by hard experience,
the officers use proven techniques and use them well.
What we learned in our study of cutters fit with many of
the ideas that Peters and Waterman wrote about succesful
business organizations in their book, IN SEARCH OF
EXCELLENCE
. What Peters and Waterman called "Productivity
through People", we talked as "The Unit Family". Much of
what they talk about in their, "Autonomy and
Entrepreneurship" attribute we think is in our, "Consistent
Management" attribute. There are other similarities, but the
main point is that the two studies have much in common.
Our result is not a cookbook approach to management at
sea. Nor is it a collection of policies and programs that
every good CO should implement. No such approach could do
justice to the complex, polychronic culture that is a Coast
Guard cutter. What we have attempted to do is present what
a sample of senior, experienced officers had to say about
excellence, and then to tell the stories of the excellent
cutters we visited. We wanted to put down on paper what
everyone talks about.
Undoubtedly there are limitations to the method we used.
We especially might be criticized for not spending enough
time to really get to the heart of the matter. Certainly,
in a single day it is tough to cover everything. We would
have liked to have spent some time aboard the cutters while
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underway. But given our schedule constraints and our desire
to keep our interference aboard to a minimum, this was not
possible. We would recommend that anyone contemplating
doing similar research with military units plan to spend a
minimum of two days on board each unit. This would allow
ample opportunity to observe a full menu of organizational
events and to complete the interviews at an unhurried pace.
However, we do feel that we were able to gain an honest
evaluation of the tone and atmosphere in each unit, and to
identify some attributes we saw at work on board the
cutters. The people we talked to meant what they were
saying
.
Another criticism that could be levelled at us is that
our results are suspect because we were able to visit only
two cutters. They do represent forty percent of the sample
we were interested in, namely cutters cited as excellent by
at least three of the senior officers interviewed in Phase
I. However, regardless of the number we visited, we have
only presented those characteristics that we observed
operating very strongly on both cutters. We are not saying
that there are not other attributes. But we believe that
the characteristics we observed are commmon to excellent
units
.
We realize that ours is not the final, all encompassing
study on the subject of excellence at sea. We feel it is a
useful first step, but much more needs to be done. We
recommend the following:
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(1) Further study focused on the cutter fleet is needed
to validate our research. An attempt should be made
to extend our study to shore stations and even staff
offices in order to identify the differences.
(2) The findings of this study, and other studies like
it, should be integrated into the leadership and
management (LAM) training programs in the Coast Guard
at all levels.
Finally, we hope that this study will be read as widely
as possible in the cutter fleet. In the daily crush of
getting our job done, we somehow never seem to discuss the
important issues. Our intent was to start the ball rolling.
We think that there can be nothing but beneficial effects
resulting from a broad dialogue about the qualities that
make a cutter better than the rest. The adage, "If you
don't know where you are going, any road will get you
there", applies in this instance. To strive for EXCELLENCE,
we must be able to recognize and understand it.
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APPENDIX A
U. S. COAST GUARD ORGANIZATION
The United States Coast Guard is an armed service orqanized
in peacetime under the Department of Transportation. in time of
war or at the President's order, the Coast Guard operates under
the jurisdiction of the United States Navy. The service numbers
approximately 40,000 officers and men manning over three hundred
ships and aircraft. Its responsibilities include ocean and
coastal search and rescue, marine inspection of U. S. vessels,
maritime pollution protection, enforcement of laws and treaties,
and boating standards.
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11th District: Long Beach, Ca
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12th District: Alameda, Ca
.
13th District: Seattle, Wa
5th District: Portsmouth, Va . * 14th District: Honolulu, Hi.
7th District: Miami, Fl . *
8th District: New Orleans, La.*
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17th District: Juneau, Ak
.
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The Area offices are primarily responsible for
administrative and planning activities to carry out headquarters
programs and policies. District offices primarily control the
operational units assigned to them. These various units, except
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